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1 Introduction
According to the conventional neoclassical theory, capital should flow “downhill” from
the rich country where the marginal return on capital is low to the poor country where
the marginal return on capital is high. Meanwhile, there would be no difference between
gross and net capital flows because capital flows would be unidirectional. The recent
empirical patterns of international capital flows, however, are in stark contrast to these
predictions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2007a,b). First, capital in the net term flows
“uphill” from poor to rich countries (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2006, 2007).
Second, financial capital flows from poor to rich countries, while foreign direct investment
(FDI, hereafter) flows in the opposite direction (Ju and Wei, 2010). Third, despite its
negative net positions of international investment since 1986, the U.S. has been receiving
a positive net investment income until 2005 (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2009; Hausmann
and Sturzenegger, 2007; Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille, 2007).
A booming literature is offering explanations for these facts. The main idea of this
literature is that financial markets suffer from imperfections and that international differ-
ences in these imperfections drive international capital flows. One line of research focuses
on financial market imperfections in the form of limited commitment, (Antras and Ca-
ballero, 2009; Antras, Desai, and Foley, 2009; Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki, 2009; Buera
and Shin, 2010; Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008; Ju and Wei, 2010; Smith and
Valderrama, 2008; Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2011). These models distinguish be-
tween different types of individuals in an economy, which are more or less productive in
the use of real capital. Financial markets serve to channel the savings of the less pro-
ductive types to the more productive types to improve aggregate production efficiency.
In a world with limited commitment, however, the more productive types cannot borrow
enough to reach the optimal allocation of capital. Another line of research focuses on the
risk-sharing function of financial markets. With incomplete financial markets, idiosyn-
cratic investment risks are not fully insurable (Angeletos and Panousi, 2011; Mendoza,
Quadrini, and Rios-Rull, 2009; Sandri, 2010). Individuals over-invest in safe but less pro-
ductive assets and under-invest in risky but more productive assets, which also distorts
aggregate production efficiency.1 The differences in these two approaches make it difficult
to compare results across models.
The purpose of this paper is to integrate both approaches into one model to allow a
direct comparison of the results and to facilitate the understanding of the two approaches.
1Another line of research focuses on the risk-sharing investors can achieve by diversifying their port-
folios globally (Devereux and Sutherland, 2009; Tille and van Wincoop, 2008, 2010). These models can
explain “uphill” capital flows, but they fail to distinguish between financial capital and FDI flows.
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We develop a tractable, two-country, overlapping-generations model, which embeds both
types of financial market imperfections, and compare their respective implications for
international capital flows and real output. In the presence of limited commitment, the
more productive individuals obtain a rate of return on their equity capital which exceeds
the social return to investment; while, due to the constraint on aggregate credit demand,
the less productive individuals obtain a loan rate which falls short of the social return.
Thus, limited commitment drives a wedge between interest rates.(Matsuyama, 2004) In
the presence of incomplete markets (Angeletos and Panousi, 2011), individuals over-invest
in the risk-free sector and under-invest in the risky sector, due to precautionary motive
and risk aversion, respectively. As a result, the risk-free interest rate is below while the
mean rate of return to risky investment is above the social rate of return. This way,
incomplete markets also drive a wedge between interest rates, albeit one of a different
kind.
Either way, the more severe the financial market distortion, the larger the interest
rate wedge. Therefore, international differences in financial market distortions lead to
international differences in interest rates, and these differences determine the patterns
of international capital flows. Equating more severe distortions with a lower degree of
financial market development, the less financially developed country has a lower return on
loans and higher return on equity in the steady state than the more financially developed
country under limited commitment. Similarly, the less developed country has a lower
risk-free interest rate and a higher mean rate of return on risky investment in the steady
state under incomplete markets. Either way, the financially less developed country is
poorer in terms of per-capita output. With full capital mobility and limited commitment,
the less financially developed country exports the savings of less productive individuals
to and imports the foreign direct investment of more productive individuals from the
more developed country. With full capital mobility and incomplete markets, savers in
the less developed country invest in risk-free projects in the more developed country,
while savers in the more developed invest in risky projects in the less developed countries.
Furthermore, the more developed country receives net capital inflows, due to its larger
credit market capacity and/or its better risk-sharing mechanism. Intuitively, the more
developed country exports its superior financial services through two-way capital flows
and receives a positive net investment income. Thus, the patterns of international capital
flows in the two models are consistent with empirical observations.
Our model differs from the existing literature in the following aspects. While Angele-
tos and Panousi (2011); Buera and Shin (2010); Carroll and Jeanne (2011); Sandri (2010);
Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) address “uphill” financial capital flows, we also
3
explain the composition of capital flows in terms of financial investment and foreign direct
investment. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008); Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull
(2009) analyze the joint determination of financial investment and FDI in an endowment-
economy model, while endogenous capital accumulation is crucial in our model to analyze
the output implications of financial integration. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008)
assume that foreign direct investors from the more financially developed country have
an advantage in capitalizing the return on investment in the host country and Mendoza,
Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) assume that investors from the more financially developed
country can insure their foreign direct investment using the better risk-sharing opportu-
nities in their home country. We do not need these extra assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model under IFA
and shows how financial frictions distort interest rates and aggregate output. Section 3
shows the patterns of international capital flows. Section 5 uses a numerical calibration
of the model to study the dynamic responses to a financial crisis in the more developed
country and how they change due to financial integration. Section 6 concludes and the
appendix collects relevant proofs.
2 The Model Under International Financial Autarky
The world economy consists of two countries, N (North) and S (South), which are funda-
mentally identical except in the level of financial development as specified later. Variables
in country i ∈ {S,N} are denoted with the superscript i. There is a tradeable final good,
which is taken as the numeraire; there are two nontradeable intermediate goods, A and
B, and the price of intermediate good k ∈ {A,B} in period t and country i is denoted by
V i,kt . In this section, we assume that international capital flows are not allowed and both
countries are under international financial autarky, IFA.
Agents live for two periods, young and old. The population size of each generation
is normalized to one in each country. Each generation consists of two types of agents,
entrepreneurs and households, of mass η and 1− η, respectively.
Agents have the preference over consumption in both periods of life. Consider agent
j born in period t, where j ∈ {e, h} denotes its identity as entrepreneur or household. If
the agent’s second-period consumption is stochastic, its expected life-time utility is,
U i,jt = (1− β) ln ci,jy,t + β ln
[
Et(c
i,j
o,t+1)
1−γ] 11−γ , (1)
where ci,jy,t and c
i,j
o,t+1 denote its consumption when young and when old; Et is the ex-
pectation operator; β ∈ (0, 1] denotes the relative weight of utility from consumption
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when old; γ ≥ 0 denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion.2 If the agent’s second-
period consumption is deterministic, its lifetime preference function is simplified as U i,jt =
(1− β) ln ci,jy,t + β ln ci,jo,t+1.
Young agents are endowed with one unit of labor, which they supply inelastically to
aggregate production. Final goods are produced instantaneously with a Cobb-Douglas
technology using the amounts M i,At and M
i,B
t of intermediate goods and labor L = 1. All
inputs are rewarded with their respective marginal products. To summarize,
Y it =
(
M i,At
α
2
)α
2
(
M i,Bt
α
2
)α
2 (
L
1− α
)1−α
,where α ∈ (0, 1), (2)
ωitL = (1− α)Y it V i,At M i,At =
α
2
Y it , V
i,B
t M
i,B
t =
α
2
Y it . (3)
Y it and ω
i
t denote aggregate output of final goods and the wage rate, respectively; the two
intermediate goods have the same factor share of α
2
in aggregate production.
Young agents can use final goods and invest them in the production of intermediate
goods, which takes one period to complete. All agents have the same technology to
produce intermediate good A, but only entrepreneurs can produce intermediate good B.
Each agent can operate only one productive project in sector A. An agent who in-
vests iit units of final goods in period t produces e
t+1iit units of intermediate good A in
period t+ 1, where the productivity shock t+1 is idiosyncratic and follows a logarithmic
normal distribution with the mean of −σ2
2
and the variance of σ2. The idiosyncratic risk
washes out at the aggregate level and the aggregate rate of transformation in sector A
is Ete

t+1 = e
Ett+1+
Var(t+1)
2 = 1. At the individual level, each agent can insure himself
against the idiosyncratic productivity risk through ex ante risk-sharing arrangements of-
fered by financial markets. Doing so, the agent receives a state-contingent transfer in
period t+ 1, Γit+1i
i
tV
A
t+1. The risk-sharing factor Γ
i
t+1 ≡ 1− et+1 + e(1−λi)t+1 − e−
λi(1−λi)
2
σ2
depends on a country-specific index of market-completeness λi ∈ [0, 1]. A negative value
of Γit+1 represents a payment made by the agent. If λ
i = 1, financial markets are complete
and the rate of return to investment in sector A is deterministic after risk-sharing,
Γit+1 + e
t+1 = 1.
2For the analytical tractability, we implicitly set the elasticity of intertemporal substitution at unity.
With this preference function, we can distinguish between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which is useful in our numerical exercise in section 5. By setting
γ = 1, we revert to the conventional preference function where CRRA is equal to the inverse of EIS,
U i,jt = (1− β) ln ci,jy,t + βEt ln ci,jo,t+1. Our analytical results in sections 2 and 3 are unaffected. See Selden
(1978) and Kocherlakota (1990) for further discussion on this preference function.
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If λi ∈ [0, 1), financial markets are incomplete and the rate of return to investment in
sector A after risk-sharing is still affected by idiosyncratic shocks,
Γit+1 + e
t+1 = 1 + e(1−λ
i)t+1 − e−λ
i(1−λi)
2
σ2 ,
with mean of 1, and variance of e[(1−λ
i)σ]2−1. In other words, uninsured idiosyncratic risk
follows a logarithmic normal distribution with the mean of − [(1−λi)σ]2
2
and the variance of
[(1− λi)σ]2.3 The expected value of the risk-sharing factor is zero in period t,
EtΓ
i
t+1 ≡ 1− eEtt+1+
Var(t+1)
2 + e(1−λ
i)Ett+1+(1−λi)2 Var(t+1)2 − e−λ
i(1−λi)
2
σ2 = 0.
Subsequently, λi is an indicator of financial development in country i.
Only entrepreneurs can produce intermediate good B one-to-one using final goods.
Assumption 1. η ∈ (0, 0.5).
Assumption 1 ensures that, in equilibrium, the aggregate saving of entrepreneurs is
less than the socially efficient investment size in sector B. Entrepreneurs finance their
investment using their own savings as equity and loans from households at the gross loan
rate of Ri,ht . For each unit of final good invested in sector B and period t, an entrepreneur
receives the revenue V i,Bt+1 in period t+ 1. Due to limited commitment, he can pledge only
a fraction θi of his future revenue as collateral for the loan he takes. Thus, his maximum
amount of borrowing in period t is
θiV i,Bt+1
Ri,ht
, and the parameter θi describes the severity
of the borrowing constraint in country i. If θi = 1, the borrowing constraint is slack; if
θi < 1, the borrowing constraint may be binding. Thus, θi is another indicator of financial
development in country i.
Let ψit denote an entrepreneur’s investment-equity ratio in sector B. From the en-
trepreneur’s point of view, each unit of equity earns its marginal revenue V i,Bt+1 in period
t + 1. Each unit of investment financed by borrowing yields the excess of its marginal
revenue over the loan rate to the entrepreneur, i.e., the net rate of return V i,Bt+1−Ri,ht . The
equity rate is defined as the entrepreneur’s gross rate of return per unit of equity capital,
Ri,et ≡ V i,Bt+1 + (ψit − 1)(V i,Bt+1 −Ri,ht ) ≥ Ri,ht , (4)
where (V i,Bt+1 −Ri,ht )(ψit− 1) captures the leverage effect. The equity rate should be no less
than the loan rate; otherwise, the entrepreneur would rather lend than borrow. Thus, the
inequality in (4) is the participation constraint for the entrepreneur. If Ri,ht < V
i,B
t+1 , the
3We model idiosyncratic productivity risk as in Angeletos (2007) and incomplete markets as in An-
geletos and Panousi (2011).
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entrepreneur borrows to the limit,
ψit =
1
1− θiV
i,B
t+1
Rit
>
1
1− θi , so that R
i,e
t =
(1− θi)
1− θiV
i,B
t+1
Ri,ht
V i,Bt+1 > V
i,B
t+1 ;
otherwise, the entrepreneur does not borrow to the limit
ψit ≤
1
1− θi , so that R
i,e
t = V
i,B
t+1 = R
i,h
t .
As production in sector B is deterministic, the equity rate, Ri,et , and the loan rate, R
i,h
t ,
are both risk free.
An agent of type j born in country i and period t receives a labor income ωit, consumes
ci,jy,t, makes a risky investment i
i,j
t in sector A, and a risk-free investment d
i,j
t = ω
i
t−ii,jt −ci,jy,t
in equity or loans in sector B. In period t+1, he gets the safe return from sector B, Ri,jt d
i,j
t ,
produces et+1ii,jt units of intermediate good A, and receives the risk-sharing transfer
Γit+1i
i,j
t V
i,A
t+1. The agent consumes the total wealth,
ci,jo,t+1 = V
i,A
t+1i
i,j
t (Γ
i
t+1 + e
t+1) +Ri,jt d
i,j
t ,
and exits from the economy.
In the following, we focus on three special cases. Let θ¯ ≡ 1 − 2η define a threshold
value. First, for λi = 1 and θi ∈ (θ¯, 1], idiosyncratic risk in sector A is fully insured and the
borrowing constraints in sector B are slack. The equilibrium allocation is unconstrained
so that investment in the two sectors is efficient and so is aggregate output. Second,
for λi = 1 and θi ∈ [0, θ¯), idiosyncratic risk in sector A is completely insured, while the
borrowing constraints in sector B are binding. Thus, limited commitment in sector B
distorts cross-sector investment, leading to inefficiently low aggregate output. Third, for
λi < 1 and θi = 1, idiosyncratic risk in sector A is partially insured while the borrowing
constraints in sector B are slack. Here, incomplete markets in sector A distort cross-sector
investment, leading to inefficiently low aggregate output.
2.1 Unconstrained Equilibrium
In this subsection, we derive the reference case of an unconstrained equilibrium, i.e., λi = 1
and θi ≥ θ¯. Idiosyncratic risk is completely insured so that the investment in sector A
has a deterministic rate of return, V i,At+1
4. A market equilibrium in country i is a set of
allocations of agents j ∈ {h, e}, investment and consumption choices and rates of return,
4See subsection 2.2 for a formal proof.
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{ii,jt , di,jt , Ri,jt , ci,jy,t, ci,jo,t}, and aggregate variables, {Y it ,M i,At ,M i,Bt , ωit, V i,At , V i,Bt }, satisfying
equations (2), (3), and (5a)-(5d).
Ri,ht = R
i,e
t = V
i,A
t+1 = V
i,B
t+1 , (5a)
ci,jy,t = (1− β)ωit, ci,jo,t+1 = βωitRi,jt , (5b)
di,et = βω
i
t, i
i,e
t = 0, d
i,h
t =
1− 2η
2(1− η)βω
i
t, i
i,h
t =
1
2(1− η)βω
i
t (5c)
M i,At+1 = (1− η)ii,ht + ηii,et =
βωit
2
, M i,Bt+1 = (1− η)di,ht + ηdi,et =
βωit
2
. (5d)
Since the two intermediate goods enter symmetrically into the Cobb-Douglas production
function (2) and the aggregate rate of transformation is equal to unity in the two sectors,
the rates of return equalize across individuals as well as across sectors; see equations (5a).
With logarithmic preferences (1), young agents consume a constant fraction (1−β) of their
labor incomes ωit and invest the rest for the rate of return R
i,j
t in period t+1; see equations
(5b). The symmetry of two intermediate goods sectors implies that aggregate savings βωit
are allocated equally in the two sectors and equations (5d) specify the aggregate output
of the two intermediate goods. Individual investment in the two sectors can be easily
derived in equations (5c).
Let ρ ≡ α
1−α . In period t+1, the aggregate revenue from producing intermediate goods,
V i,At+1M
i,A
t+1 + V
i,B
t+1M
i,B
t+1 = αY
i
t+1 = ρω
i
t+1, is distributed to entrepreneurs and households as
the return to their savings,
βωit[(1− η)Ri,ht + ηRi,et ] = ρωit+1 ⇒ (1− η)Ri,ht + ηRi,et = Ψit. (6)
where Ψit ≡ V
i,A
t+1M
i,A
t+1+V
i,B
t+1M
i,B
t+1
βωit
=
ρωit+1
βωit
denotes the social rate of return to aggregate
investment and its steady-state value is ΨiIFA =
ρ
β
.
Let χit+1 ≡ V
i,A
t+1
V i,Bt+1
denote the relative intermediate goods price in period t + 1. Let
XIFA denote the steady-state value of any particular variable Xt under IFA. Lemma 2.1
characterizes the reference case.
Lemma 2.1. Let λi = 1 and θi ∈ (θ¯, 1]. The model dynamics can be characterized by the
dynamics of wages, ωit+1 =
(
ωit
ΨIFA
)α
. There exists a unique and stable non-zero steady
state in country i with the wage at ωiIFA = Ψ
−ρ
IFA.
Private and social rates of return coincide, Ri,ht = R
i,e
t = Ψ
i
t = V
i,A
t+1 = V
i,B
t+1 . In the
steady state, Ri,hIFA = R
i,e
IFA = Ψ
i
IFA.
Aggregate savings βωit are equally invested in the two sectors, M
i,A
t+1 = M
i,B
t+1 =
βωit
2
.
The relative intermediate goods price is χiIFA = 1.
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2.2 Equilibrium with Limited Commitment
For λi = 1, idiosyncratic risk is completely insured so that the investment in sector
A and period t has a deterministic rate of return, V i,At+1. If the borrowing constraints
are binding, a market equilibrium in country i under IFA is a set of allocation of agents
j ∈ {h, e}, consumption and investment choices and rates of return {ii,jt , di,jt , Ri,jt , ci,jy,t, ci,jo,t},
and aggregate variables, {Y it ,M i,At ,M i,Bt , ωit, V i,At , V i,Bt }, satisfying equations (2), (3), and
(7a)-(7e).
Ri,ht
(1− η)
η
di,ht = θ
iV i,Bt+1 [
(1− η)
η
di,ht + d
i,e
t ], (7a)
Ri,ht = V
i,A
t+1, , R
i,e
t =
(1− θi)V i,Bt+1
1− θiV
i,B
t+1
Ri,ht
> Ri,ht , (7b)
ci,jy,t = (1− β)ωit, ci,jo,t+1 = βωitRi,jt , (7c)
di,et = βω
i
t, i
i,e
t = 0, d
i,h
t + i
i,h
t = βω
i
t, (7d)
M i,At+1 = (1− η)ii,ht + ηii,et , M i,Bt+1 = (1− η)di,ht + ηdi,et . (7e)
Given the relative population mass of households and entrepreneurs, (1−η)
η
, and the lending
of each household, di,ht , an entrepreneur obtains a loan of
(1−η)
η
di,ht in equilibrium. He
finances his total investment in sector B using his own capital, di,et , and the loan. Equation
(7a) specifies his borrowing constraint. Investing in sector A and lending to entrepreneurs
are perfect substitutes for households. The binding borrowing constraints have a general
equilibrium effect causing the equity rate to be higher than the loan rate; see equations
(7b). Young agents consume a constant fraction (1−β) of their labor income and invests
the rest at the rate of return Ri,jt . Old agents consume the entire return on investment; see
equations (7c). Since the rate of return in sector A equals the loan rate, while the equity
rate is higher than the loan rate, entrepreneurs only invest in sector B, while households
invest directly in sector A and in loans to entrepreneurs; see equations (7d). Equations
(7e) describe aggregate output of intermediate goods.
The binding borrowing constraints keep aggregate credit demand and aggregate in-
vestment in sector B inefficiently low. This has three consequences. First, the cross-sector
investment distortion keeps the relative intermediate goods price below unity; second, the
loan rate falls below the social rate of return to clear the credit market, while the equity
rate rises above the social rate of return due to the leverage effect; third, the investment
distortion keeps aggregate output inefficiently low. We define an indicator of production
efficiency, Λit ≡
2
√
χit+1
1+χit+1
. The model solutions under international financial autarky are
9
summarized as follows,
χit+1 = χ
i
IFA ≡ 1−
θ¯ − θi
1− η < 1, and
∂χiIFA
∂θi
> 0, (8a)
Ri,ht = V
i,A
t+1 = Ψ
i
t
[
1− (1− χ
i
IFA)
2
]
< Ψit, (8b)
V i,Bt+1 =
V i,At+1
χit+1
= Ψit
[
1 +
1
χiIFA
− 1
2
]
> Ψit, (8c)
Λit = Λ
i
IFA ≡
2
√
χiIFA
1 + χiIFA
< 1,
∂ΛiIFA
∂θi
=
∂χiIFA
∂θi
(1− χiIFA)ΛiIFA
2χiIFA(1 + χ
i
IFA)
> 0, (8d)
ωit+1 =
(
ΛiIFA
ΨIFA
ωit
)α
, (8e)
Ri,et = Ψ
i
t
[
1 +
(1− η)(1− χiIFA)
2η
]
> Ψit. (8f)
The relative intermediate goods price, χit+1, and the indicator of production efficiency Λ
i
t
are time-invariant and positively related to θi. Aggregate output is proportional to the
wage rate, Y it =
ωit
(1−α) . Thus, the model dynamics can be characterized by the dynamics
of wages. In view of equation (8e) and with α ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique and stable
steady state with the wage at wiIFA =
(
ΛiIFA
ΨIFA
)ρ
. Obviously, as long as θi ∈ [0, θ¯), the
relative intermediate goods price is less than unity, reflecting the distortion of the binding
borrowing constraints. It justifies our definition of the threshold value.
According to equation (8d),
∂ΛiIFA
∂θi
> 0, and ΛiIFA reaches the maximum of one, when
the borrowing constraint is weakly binding at θi = θ¯. The relative intermediate goods
price is a key variable measuring the distortion on investment composition. According to
equation (8a),
∂χiIFA
∂θi
> 0 and χiIFA reaches the maximum of one, for θ
i = θ¯. Thus, the
higher the relative intermediate goods price, the smaller the output distortion. Alterna-
tively, in the country with a higher θi, entrepreneurs are less credit constrained so that
cross-sector investment allocation is more efficient. Thus, the relative intermediate goods
price is higher and so is the loan rate and aggregate output, while the equity rate is lower.
Proposition 2.1 summarizes the case where the borrowing constraints are binding.
Proposition 2.1. Let λi = 1 and θi ∈ [0, θ¯). There exists a unique and stable non-zero
steady state in country i with the wage at ωiIFA =
(
ΛiIFA
ΨIFA
)ρ
.
Limited commitment creates a wedge between the private and social rates of return,
Ri,ht = V
i,A
t+1 < Ψ
i
t < V
i,B
t+1 < R
i,e
t . In the steady state, the loan rate rises and the equity
rate falls in θi.
Limited commitment distorts the investment made by agents with different productivity.
The deviation of χiIFA from unity reflects the output distortion, which declines in θ
i.
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2.3 Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets
For simplicity, we set θi = 1 such that the borrowing constraints are slack in sector B and
the equity rate coincides with the loan rate. As we do not have to distinguish the equity
rate and the loan rate here, let Rit ≡ Ri,ht = Ri,et define the rate of return in sector B which
is risk-free. For λi < 1, idiosyncratic risk is partially insured so that the investment return
in sector A is still stochastic after risk sharing. Since all agents face the same risk-free
interest rate Rit and have the same production technology in sector A with risky return,
we do not need to distinguish between entrepreneurs and households in this subsection.
Suppose that an agent invests a fraction φit of its total savings into sector A. Let
ξˆit+1 ≡ (1 − φit)Rit + φit(Γit+1 + et+1)V i,At+1 and ξit ≡
[
Et(ξˆ
i
t+1)
1−γ
] 1
1−γ
denote the ex post
rate of return and the risk-adjusted expected rate of return to its portfolio investment,
respectively. The agent’s utility maximization problem is reformulated as
max
ciy,t,φ
i
t
(1− β) ln ciy,t + β ln(ωit − ciy,t) + β ln ξit.
Define the Sharpe ratio as ζ it ≡ lnV
i,A
t+1−lnRit+1
(1−λi)σ to measure the excess mean return per
unit of uninsured risk in sector A. A market equilibrium in country i is a set of allocation
of agents’ consumption and investment choices {φit, ciy,t, cio,t}, and aggregate variables,
{Y it ,M i,At ,M i,Bt , ωit, Rit, ζ it , V i,At , V i,Bt }, satisfying equations (2), (3), (9a)-(9d).
Rit = V
i,B
t+1 , (9a)
ciy,t = (1− β)ωit, cio,t+1 = βωitξˆit+1, (9b)
φit ≈
lnV i,At+1 − lnRit+1
γ[(1− λi)σ]2 ≈
χit+1 − 1
γ[(1− λi)σ]2 , (9c)
M i,At+1 = φ
i
tβω
i
t, M
i,B
t+1 = (1− φit)βωit. (9d)
The risk-free interest rate is equal to the marginal return in sector B; see equation (9a). As
shown in Angeletos (2007), the optimal choices of individual consumption and investment
portfolio are the solutions to the standard Samuelson-Merton problem, as in equations
(9b)-(9c). Equations (9d) specify the aggregate output of the two intermediate goods.
The fraction of aggregate savings φitβω
i
t invested in sector A and period t requires a
mean rate of return V i,At+1 and the remaining investment in sector B (1− φit)βωit requires a
risk-free rate of return Rit = V
i,B
t+1 . In period t+ 1, the aggregate revenue from producing
intermediate goods, V i,At+1M
i,A
t+1 + V
i,B
t+1M
i,B
t+1 = αY
i
t+1 = ρω
i
t+1, is distributed to all agents,
βωit[φ
i
tV
i,A
t + (1− φit)Rit] = ρωit+1 ⇒ φitV i,At + (1− φit)Rit = Ψit. (10)
In the case of incomplete markets, agents invest too much in the risk-free sector B
and too little in the risky sector A. This has four consequences. First, the cross-sector
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investment distortion keeps the relative intermediate goods price above unity; second, the
risk-free interest rate is depressed below the social rate of return; third, the Sharpe ratio
is positive, reflecting the risk premium per unit of uninsured idiosyncratic risk in sector
A; fourth, the cross-sector investment distortion keeps aggregate output inefficiently low.
The model solutions under IFA are summarized as follows,
χit+1 ≈ χiIFA ≡
√
1 + γ[(1− λi)σ]2 > 1, and ∂χ
i
IFA
∂λi
< 0, (11a)
Rit = V
i,B
t+1 ≈ Ψit
[
1 +
1
χiIFA
− 1
2
]
< Ψit, (11b)
V i,At+1 = V
i,B
t+1χ
i
t+1 ≈ Ψit
[
1− 1− χ
i
IFA
2
]
> Ψit, (11c)
Λit ≈ ΛiIFA ≡
2
√
χiIFA
1 + χiIFA
< 1,
∂ΛiIFA
∂λi
=
∂χiIFA
∂λi
(1− χiIFA)ΛiIFA
2χiIFA(1 + χ
i
IFA)
> 0, (11d)
ωit+1 =
(
ΛiIFA
ΨIFA
ωit
)α
where ΛiIFA =
2
√
χiIFA
1 + χiIFA
< 1, (11e)
φit ≈
1
χiIFA + 1
<
1
2
, ζ it ≈ ζ iIFA ≡
√
γ
(
1− 2
χiIFA + 1
)
> 0, (11f)
ξit ≈ Rit
[
1 +
(ζ it)
2
2γ
]
≈ Ψit
[
1−
1− 1
χiIFA
4
]
< Ψit. (11g)
The relative intermediate goods price, χit+1, and the efficiency indicator Λ
i
t are time-
invariant and positively related to λi. Aggregate output is proportional to the wage rate,
Y it =
ωit
(1−α) . Thus, the model dynamics can be characterized by the dynamics of wages. In
view of equation (11e) and with α ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique and stable steady state
with the wage at wiIFA =
(
ΛiIFA
ΨIFA
)ρ
.
According to equation (11d),
∂ΛiIFA
∂λi
> 0 and ΛiIFA reaches the maximum of one in
the case of complete markets λi = 1. The relative intermediate goods price is a key
variable measuring the distortion in investment composition. According to equation (11a),
∂χiIFA
∂λi
< 0 and ΛiIFA reaches the minimum value of one, for λ
i = 1. Thus, the smaller
the relative intermediate goods price, the smaller the output distortion. In other words,
in the country with a higher λi, a larger fraction of idiosyncratic risk is insured so that
cross-sector investment allocation is less distorted. The risk-free interest rate is higher
and so is aggregate output, while the relative intermediate goods price is lower and so is
the Sharpe ratio. Proposition 2.2 summarizes the case of incomplete markets.
Proposition 2.2. Let λi ∈ [0, 1) and θi = 1. There exists a unique and stable non-zero
steady state in country i with the wage at ωiIFA =
(
ΛiIFA
ΨIFA
)ρ
.
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Incomplete markets create a wedge between the private and social rates of return,
Rit = V
i,B
t+1 < ξ
i
t < Ψ
i
t < V
i,A
t+1. In the steady state, the risk-free rate and the risk-adjusted
rate of portfolio return rise in λi, while the Sharpe ratio falls in λi.
Incomplete markets distort investment among sectors with different riskiness. The
deviation of χiIFA from unity reflects the output distortion, which declines in λ
i.
3 The Model Under Full Capital Mobility
Under full capital mobility, agents can lend and make direct investments abroad. The
two countries are initially in the steady state under IFA before capital mobility is allowed
in period t = 0. We investigate the patterns of capital flows, interest rate, and output in
the presence of limited commitment and incomplete markets, respectively.
3.1 The Equilibrium with Limited Commitment Only
We assume λS = λN = 1 and 0 ≤ θS < θN ≤ θ¯ such that idiosyncratic risk in sector A is
fully insured, the borrowing constraints in sector B are binding in both countries under
IFA as well as under full capital mobility, and country N is more financially developed
than country S. Financial capital flows refer to the size of household lending abroad, while
FDI flows refer to the size of investment made by entrepreneurs abroad. Let Φit and Ω
i
t
denote the aggregate outflows of financial capital and FDI from country i in period t,
respectively, with negative values indicating capital inflows.
With capital mobility, net credit supply in country i is (1 − η)(βωit − ii,At ) − Φit, and
aggregate equity capital invested in country i is ηβωit −Ωit. Assuming that entrepreneurs
borrow in the country where they invest in the production of intermediate good B, FDI
flows raise aggregate credit demand in the host country and reduce it in the source country.
With these changes, the analysis in subsection 2.2 carries through due to the linearity of
intermediate goods production and the borrowing constraints. Financial capital flows
equalize loan rates and FDI flows equalize equity rates across the border. Credit and
equity markets clear in each country as well at the world level. FDI flows directly affect
aggregate output of intermediate good B in each country. To summarize,
RS,ht = R
N,h
t = R
∗,h
t , R
S,e
t = R
N,e
t = R
∗,e
t , Φ
S
t + Φ
N
t = Ω
S
t + Ω
N
t = 0, (12a)
Φit = (1− η)(βωit − ii,ht )− (ψit − 1)(ηβωit − Ωit), M i,Bt+1 = ψit(ηβωit − Ωit). (12b)
The remaining conditions for market equilibrium are same as under IFA.
At the world level, aggregate revenue of intermediate goods in period t+1 is distributed
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to households and entrepreneurs as the return to their savings in period t,
[(1− η)R∗,ht + ηR∗,et ]
∑
i∈{S,N}
βωit =
∑
i∈{S,N}
(vi,At+1M
i,A
t+1 + v
i,B
t+1M
i,B
t+1) =
∑
i∈{S,N}
ρωit+1. (13)
Let ωwt ≡ ω
S
t +ω
N
t
2
denote the world average wage in period t and Ψwt ≡ ω
w
t+1
ωwt
ρ
β
denote the
social rate of return at the world level. Equation (13) is simplified as
(1− η)R∗,ht + ηR∗,et = Ψwt . (14)
Lemma 3.1. Under full capital mobility, the relative intermediate goods price is time-
invariant and there exists a unique and stable steady state.
Let XFCM denote the steady-state value of variable X under full capital mobil-
ity. Define ℘iIFA ≡ R
i,e
IFA
ΨIFA
= 1 +
(1−η)(1−χiIFA)
2η
, ∆χiFCM ≡ χiFCM − χiIFA, and Z iFCM ≡
∆χiFCMR
i,e
IFA
∆χiFCM+
1−θi
(1−η)℘i
IFA
. The model solutions under full capital mobility are,
Ri,et =
ωwt+1
ωwt
(Ri,eIFA −Z iFCM), (15a)
Ri,ht =
ωwt+1
ωwt
(
Ri,hIFA +
η
1− ηZ
i
FCM
)
. (15b)
χit+1 = χ
i
FCM =
(1− θi)Ri,ht
Ri,et
+ θi, (15c)
Φit = (1− η)βωit
[
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,hIFA
R∗,ht
]
(15d)
Ωit = ηβω
i
t
[
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
Ri,eIFA
R∗,et
]
(15e)
Ωit + Φ
i
t = βω
i
t
{
1− ω
i
t+1
ωit
[
η
Ri,eIFA
R∗,et
+ (1− η)R
i,h
IFA
R∗,ht
]}
(15f)
ωit+1 = (χ
i
FCM)
ρ
2 (R∗t )
−ρ. (15g)
In the steady state under full capital mobility, interest rates and capital flows are,
Ri,eFCM = R
i,e
IFA −Z iFCM , (16a)
Ri,hFCM = R
i,h
IFA +
η
1− ηZ
i
FCM , (16b)
ΦiFCM = (1− η)βωiFCM
(
1− R
i,h
IFA
R∗,hFCM
)
= ηβωiFCM
Z iFCM
R∗,hFCM
, (16c)
ΩiFCM = ηβω
i
FCM
(
1− R
i,e
IFA
R∗,eFCM
)
= −ηβωiFCM
Z iFCM
R∗,eFCM
, (16d)
ΦiFCM + Ω
i
FCM = ηβω
i
FCMZ iFCM
(R∗,eFCM −R∗,hFCM)
R∗,eFCMR
∗,h
FCM
. (16e)
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Proposition 3.1. In the steady state, the world interest rates are R∗,hFCM ∈ (RS,hIFA, RN,hIFA)
and R∗,eFCM ∈ (RN,eIFA, RS,eIFA). Full capital mobility raises (reduces) the relative price in
country S (N), χSIFA < χ
S
FCM < χ
N
FCM < χ
N
IFA; financial capital flows from country S to
country N, FDI flows in the opposite direction, and net capital flows from country S to
country N, ΦSFCM > 0 > Ω
S
FCM and Φ
S
FCM + Ω
S
FCM > 0. Gross international investment
return sums up to zero in each country, ΦiFCMR
∗,h
FCM + Ω
i
FCMR
∗,e
FCM = 0.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from equations (16a)-(16e).
In the steady state under IFA, aggregate output is higher in country N than in country
S. Under full capital mobility, country N, which is more financially developed, imports
financial capital and exports FDI; overall, it has net capital inflows. Note that interna-
tional capital flows lead to the partial convergence of the relative intermediate goods price
in the two countries, implying that capital mobility improves investment composition in
country S which is less financially developed. Since the rate of return to its foreign assets
(FDI outflows) is higher than the interest rate it pays for its foreign liabilities (financial
capital inflows), R∗,eFCM > R
∗,h
FCM , country N receives a positive net international invest-
ment income, ΦNFCM(R
∗,h
FCM − 1) + ΩNFCM(R∗,eFCM − 1) = 0− (ΦNFCM + ΩNFCM) > 0, despite
its negative international investment position, ΦNFCM + Ω
N
FCM < 0. This way, our model
results are consistent with the three recent empirical facts.
3.2 The Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets Only
We assume 0 ≤ λS < λN < 1 and θS = θN = 1 such that idiosyncratic risk in sector A is
partially insured, the borrowing constraints in sector B are slack in both countries under
IFA as well as under full capital mobility, and country N is more financially developed
than country S. Financial capital flows refer to the size of risk-free lending abroad, while
FDI flows refer to the size of risky investment made in sector B abroad. Let Φit and Ω
i
t
denote the aggregate outflows of financial capital and FDI from country i in period t,
respectively, with negative values indicating capital inflows.
Agents optimally chooses between the risk-free investment in sector B domestically
and the risk-free lending abroad. In equilibrium, financial capital flows equalize the risk-
free interest rate globally. In the meantime, agents optimally chooses between investing
in sector A domestically and abroad. By assumption, agents obtain risk sharing in the
country where they invest in the production of intermediate good A. In equilibrium, FDI
flows equalize the Sharpe ratio globally. See the proof of lemma 3.2 for details.
In the steady state under IFA, the risk-free interest rate is higher in country N, while
the Sharpe ratio is higher in country S. Thus, similar as in the setting with limited
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commitment only, financial capital flows from country S to country N, while FDI flows in
the opposite direction, ΦSt > 0 > Ω
S
t . To summarize,
ΦSt + Φ
N
t = Ω
S
t + Ω
N
t = 0, R
S
t = R
N
t = R
∗
t , ζ
S
t = ζ
N
t = ζ
∗
t . (17a)
βωSt =
MS,At+1 + Ω
S
t
φSt
= MS,At+1 +M
S,B
t+1 + Φ
S
t + Ω
S
t , (17b)
βωNt =
MN,At+1
φNt
+
ΩNt
φSt
= MN,At+1 +M
N,B
t+1 + Φ
N
t + Ω
N
t . (17c)
The remaining conditions for market equilibrium are same as under IFA.
Lemma 3.2. Under full capital mobility, the relative intermediate goods price is time-
invariant and there exists a unique and stable steady state.
The cross-border equalization of the risk-free interest rate, RNt = R
S
t = R
∗
t , and that
of the Sharpe ratio, ζNt = ζ
S
t = ζ
∗
t , jointly imply that of the mean rate of portfolio return,
RNt e
(ζNt )
2
γ = RSt e
(ζSt )
2
γ = R∗t e
(ζ∗t )2
γ . At the world level, aggregate revenue of intermediate
goods in period t+ 1 is distributed to agents as the return to their savings in period t,
R∗t e
(ζ∗t )2
γ β(ωNt + ω
S
t ) = ρ(ω
N
t+1 + ω
S
t+1), ⇒ R∗t [1 +
(ζ∗t )
2
γ
] ≈ ρω
w
t+1
βωwt
. (18)
Define an auxiliary variable Z iFCM ≡ ∆χ
i
FCMR
i
IFA
∆χiFCM+
2χi
IFA
(χi
IFA
−1)
χi
IFA
+χi
FCM
−2
. The model solutions under
full capital mobility are,
Rit =
ωwt+1
ωwt
(RiIFA −Z iFCM), (19a)
ΦSt = −ΦNt = (1− φSt )βωSt
1− ωSt+1
ωSt
RSIFA
R∗t
χSIFA − 1
χSIFA − χ
S
FCM
χSIFA
 (19b)
ΩSt = −ΩNt = φSβωSt
[
1− ω
S
t+1
ωSt
RSIFA
R∗t
χSIFA(χ
S
IFA − 1)
χSFCM(χ
S
FCM − 1)
]
(19c)
ΩSt + Φ
S
t = −(ΩNt + ΦNt ) = βωSt
[
1− ω
S
t+1
ωSt
RSIFA
R∗t
1 + 1
χSFCM
1 + 1
χSIFA
]
(19d)
ωit+1 = (χ
i
FCM)
− ρ
2 (R∗t )
−ρ. (19e)
In the steady state under full capital mobility, interest rates and capital flows are,
RiFCM = R
i
IFA −Z iFCM , (20a)
ΦSFCM = −βωSFCM
∆χSFCM(χ
S
FCM + χ
S
IFA)
2[(χSIFA)
2 − 1] (20b)
ΩSFCM = βω
S
FCM
∆χSFCM(χ
S
FCM + χ
S
IFA)
2χSFCM [(χ
S
IFA)
2 − 1] , (20c)
ΦSFCM + Ω
S
FCM = −βωSFCM
∆χSFCM(χ
S
FCM + χ
S
IFA)(χ
S
FCM − 1)
2χSFCM [(χ
S
IFA)
2 − 1] . (20d)
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Proposition 3.2. In the steady state, the world risk-free interest rates are R∗FCM ∈
(RSIFA, R
N
IFA). Full capital mobility reduces (raises) the relative price in country S (N),
χNIFA < χ
N
FCM < χ
S
FCM < χ
S
IFA; financial capital flows from country S to country N,
FDI flows in the opposite direction, and net capital flows from country S to country N,
ΦSFCM > 0 > Ω
S
FCM and Φ
S
FCM + Ω
S
FCM > 0. Gross international investment return sums
up to zero in each country, ΦSFCMR
∗
FCM + Ω
S
FCMV
S,A
FCM = 0.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from equations (20a)-(20d).
In the steady state under IFA, aggregate output is higher in country N than in country
S. Under full capital mobility, country N, which is more financially developed, imports fi-
nancial capital and exports FDI; overall, it has net capital inflows. Note that international
capital flows lead to the partial convergence of the relative intermediate goods price in the
two countries, implying that capital mobility improves investment composition in country
S which is less financially developed. Since the rate of return to its foreign assets (FDI
outflows) is higher than the interest rate it pays for its foreign liabilities (financial capital
inflows), V S,AFCM = R
∗
FCMχ
S
FCM > R
∗
FCM , country N receives a positive net international
investment income, ΦNFCM(R
∗
FCM − 1) + ΩNFCM(V S,AFCM − 1) = 0 − (ΦNFCM + ΩNFCM) > 0,
despite its negative international investment position, ΦNFCM + Ω
N
FCM < 0. This way, our
model results are compatible with the empirical evidence noted above.
4 Model Comparison
Although limited commitment and incomplete markets feature different aspects of fi-
nancial market imperfections, they have the same qualitative distortions on aggregate
investment, production efficiency, and interest rates under IFA in our framework; see
Proposition 2.1 and 2.2. In particular, comparing equations (8a)-(8e) with (11a)-(11e), we
show that the analytical solutions to major endogenous variables under IFA are identical.
Here, the relative intermediate goods price, χit+1 =
V i,At+1
V i,Bt+1
, is the key variable reflecting such
distortions. Since the price of intermediate goods in the sector with financial frictions is
higher than in the other sector, χit+1 is smaller than unity in the settings with only limited
commitment and larger than unity in the setting with incomplete markets. Proposition
4.1 establishes a result of analytical equivalence between the two model settings.
Proposition 4.1. For 1 +
√
1 + γ[(1− λi)σ]2 ≤ 1
η
, there exists a one-to-one mapping
between θi and λi such that the steady-state output and investment are same across the
two alternative model settings and so are the loan rate and the risk-free interest rate. In
particular, this mapping takes the following form, 1− θ¯−θi
1−η =
1√
1+γ[(1−λi)σ]2 .
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For the empirically relevant values of γ and σ, the condition 1+
√
1 + γ[(1− λi)σ]2 ≤ 1
η
holds, if the population share of entrepreneurs, η, is sufficiently small.5 Intuitively, when
the population share of entrepreneurs becomes larger, the entrepreneurial sector as a whole
becomes less borrowing constrained in equilibrium, which weakens the macroeconomic
importance of financial frictions.
Under full capital mobility, the steady-state patterns of capital flows, relative prices,
interest rates, aggregate output are also qualitatively identical across the two model set-
tings; see Proposition 3.1 and 3.2. Furthermore, section 5 shows in a numerical example
that the model dynamics with respect to a financial crisis are also qualitatively identical
across the two settings.
5 A Dynamic Analysis of Financial Crisis
So far, we have shown that the steady-state patterns of international capital flows under
the two alternative settings are qualitatively identical. In the following, we compare nu-
merically the transitional dynamics of the two model settings in the case of a financial
crisis. Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) develop a two-country model with infinitely-lived
agents, idiosyncratic endowment risk, and incomplete markets. A financial crisis is fea-
tured in their model as an unexpected decline in bank equity. In our framework, a financial
crisis is modeled as an unexpected decline in θN and λN , respectively. The purpose of this
analysis is to investigate whether international financial integration magnifies or dampens
the economic responses to financial crisis in country N under our two alternative settings.
We also compare our results with those in Mendoza and Quadrini (2010).
The parameter values are chosen only for illustration purpose as follows. The pop-
ulation share of entrepreneurs is set at η = 10%, implying that the threshold value
θ¯ = 1 − 2η = 0.8; the share of labor income in aggregate output is 1 − α = 64%; the
lifetime share of utility from consumption when old is β = 0.4; the standard deviation of
idiosyncratic risk is set at σ = 0.8 and the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 10.
According to Proposition 4.1, there exists a one-to-one mapping between the two key
parameters, θi and λi, such that the steady-state aggregate output in country i under IFA
is same across the two alternative settings. Thus, in order to make the model economy
5The value of γ is set around 10 in the macro-finance literature to generate plausible risk premia.
Angeletos and Panousi (2011) choose σ = 0.5 in their numerical exercise, consistent with the preferred
value in Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2005); Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). In
order to check how tight the condition in Proposition 4.1 is, we choose the upper bounds of these
parameters as γ = 15 and σ = 1. Given λi ∈ [0, 1], as long as the population share of entrepreneurs is
η ≤ 0.2, this condition holds.
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under the two settings comparable, we choose the values of θi and λi, according to this
one-to-one mapping. In the setting with only limited commitment, we set θN = 0.75 and
θS = 0.25, while keeping λN = λS = 1; in the setting with only incomplete markets, we
set λN = 0.86 and λS = 0.06, while keeping θN = θS = 1.
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Figure 1: Financial Crisis in the Setting with Limited Commitment
Let us first look at the setting with only limited commitment. Suppose that the
world economy is initially in the steady state under full capital mobility before θN falls
permanently from 0.75 to 0.5 in period t = 0. Figure 1 show the dynamic responses of
variables in levels.
From period t = 0 on, entrepreneurs in country N are subject to tighter borrowing
constraints. The decline in aggregate credit demand forces the loan rate in country N,
RN,ht to fall to clear the credit market. Meanwhile, it also makes aggregate investment
tilted more towards sector A so that the price of intermediate good B rises in country N.
The rise in the price of intermediate good B, V N,Bt+1 , and the decline in the loan rate, R
N,h
t ,
tend to raise the equity rate while the decline in the investment-equity ratio, ψNt , tends
to reduce the equity rate. Overall, the first effect dominates the last effect so that the
equity rate in country N, RN,ht , rises. The rise in the equity rate induces entrepreneurs
in country N to reduce their FDI outflows, ΩNt , and the decline in the loan rate induces
households in country S to reduce their foreign lending, leading to a decline in financial
capital inflows, ΥNt . Thus, both FDI outflows and financial capital inflows shrink. Since
the aggregate credit capacity in country N falls, net capital inflows, ΩNt +Υ
N
t , also shrink.
The decline in effective aggregate credit demand directly worsens cross-sector investment
composition and the decline in net capital inflows reduces further the size of aggregate
domestic investment in country N. Thus, aggregate output in country N, Y Nt , declines.
Let us look at country S. By reducing their foreign lending, households save more
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domestically and the rise in credit supply pushes down the loan rate, RS,ht , justifying the
global equalization of the loan rate; the decline in the loan rate reduces the borrowing
costs for entrepreneurs and the equity rate, RS,et rises in country S, justifying the global
equalization of the equity rate. Aggregate output is affected by two opposite forces.
First, the decline in net capital outflows raises the size of aggregate domestic investment,
which tends to raises aggregate output. Second, the decline in FDI inflows and financial
capital outflows worsens the cross-sector investment composition, which tends to reduces
aggregate output. The overall impact depends on the relative magnitude of the two forces.
According to von Hagen and Zhang (2011), for θS close to zero, the composition effect
dominates the size effect so that aggregate output falls; otherwise, aggregate output rises.
Given the chosen parameter values, aggregate output in country S, Y St rises.
Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) ask whether financial integration amplifies or dampens
the impacts of financial crisis on country N. In their model, unrecovered loans reduce bank
equity unexpectedly, leading to the lending contraction and the decline in the demand
for productive assets. Since financial integration creates larger financial markets, credit
contraction and the negative impacts on asset prices are spread among countries that
are financially integrated. Thus, in comparison with financial autarky, the responses of
asset price are smaller under financial integration. However, given their model setting,
the financial crisis does not affect aggregate output.
In order to see whether financial integration magnifies or dampens the impacts of the
financial crisis in our model, we conduct a counterfactual experiment where country N is
initially in the steady state under IFA before θN declines in period t = 0 and country N
stays under financial autarky permanently upon as well as after the crisis. Figure 2 show
the dynamic responses of variables in country N in the percentage deviations from their
steady-state levels under full capital mobility versus under IFA, respectively. Obviously,
country S is not affected by the crisis under IFA.
Equity capital in our model can be interpreted as an asset held by entrepreneurs and
thus, the asset price is by definition the inverse of the equity rate. As in Mendoza and
Quadrini (2010), we find that the asset price responds less to the financial crisis under full
capital mobility than under IFA. Our model setting allows the endogenous responses of ag-
gregate output. The financial crisis only worsens the cross-sector investment composition
under IFA, while the decline in net capital inflows further reduces the size of aggregate
domestic investment under full capital mobility. Thus, financial integration magnifies the
output responses. Intuitively, country N responds to financial crisis through the price
channel (interest rates) and the quantity channel (investment and output). Financial
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Figure 2: The Role of Financial Integration in the Setting with Limited Commitment
integration magnifies the quantity effect while dampens the price effect.6
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Figure 3: Financial Crisis in the Setting with Incomplete Markets
Now let us consider the setting with only incomplete markets. Suppose that the
world economy is initially in the steady state under full capital mobility before λN falls
permanently from 0.86 to 0.56 in period t = 0. As mentioned above, the value of λN is
chosen consistently with θN such that aggregate output in country N under IFA is same
across the two model settings. Figure 3 show the dynamic responses of variables in levels.
The dynamic mechanism is essentially similar as in the setting with only limited com-
mitment. A decline of λN implies that financial markets insure a smaller fraction of
idiosyncratic risk in sector A. Since individual investors in country N have to bear a
larger fraction of idiosyncratic risk, they reduce their risky investment in sector A and
6Although output in country N declines more dramatically to financial crisis in percentage points
under financial integration than under IFA, aggregate output in country N is always higher under financial
integration than under IFA, thanks to net capital inflows.
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raise their risk-free investment in sector B. Thus, the mean rate of return in sector A,
V N,At , rises and the risk-free rate, R
N
t falls. The Sharpe Ratio, ζ
N
t , rises to accommodate
the increase in the riskiness of the investment in sector A. However, the risk-adjusted
expected rate of portfolio return, ξNt , still declines. The rise in the Sharpe ratio induces
investors in country N to reduce their FDI outflows, ΩNt , and the decline in the risk-free
rate in country N induces investors in country S to reduce their risk-free lending abroad,
implying a decline in the financial capital inflows, ΥNt . Thus, both FDI outflows and
financial capital inflows shrink. Since the risk-sharing capacity in country N falls, net
capital inflows, ΩNt + Υ
N
t , also shrink. The decline in the risk-sharing capacity directly
worsens the cross-sector investment composition and the decline in net capital inflows
reduces the size of aggregate domestic investment in country N. Thus, aggregate output
in country N, Y Nt , declines.
Let us look at country S. First, by reducing their foreign risk-free lending, individuals
invest more domestically so that the risk-free rate, RSt , falls, justifying the global equal-
ization of the risk-free rate. Second, the decline in FDI inflows reduces the investment
in sector A, implying a rise in the mean rate of return to the risky investment, V S,At .
Both factors lead to a rise in the Sharpe ratio, ζSt , justifying the global equalization of
the Sharpe ratio. Aggregate output is affected by two opposite forces. First, the decline
in net capital outflows raises the size of aggregate domestic investment, which tends to
raises aggregate output. Second, the decline in FDI inflows and financial capital outflows
worsens the cross-sector investment composition, which tends to reduces aggregate out-
put. The overall impact depends on the relative magnitude of the two forces. Similar as
the analysis in von Hagen and Zhang (2011), under certain parameter values, for λS close
to zero, the composition effect dominates the size effect so that aggregate output falls;
otherwise, aggregate output rises. Given the chosen parameter values, aggregate output
rises in country S.
Figure 4 shows the dynamic responses of variables in country N in the percentage
deviations from their steady-state levels under full capital mobility versus under IFA,
respectively. As in the setting with only limited commitment, financial integration helps
country N spread out the impacts of financial crisis on the risk-free rate as well as on the
Sharpe ratio (risk-adjusted risk premium) across the world. However, due to the decline
in the net capital inflows, aggregate output responds more under full capital mobility
than under IFA. Again, financial integration magnifies the quantity effect while dampens
the price effect.
To sum up, a financial crisis either in the form of a tightening of collateral constraints
or in the form of a worsening of the risk-sharing capacity of the financial market system in
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Figure 4: The Role of Financial Integration in the Setting with Incomplete Markets
the more advanced country produces a recession in the more financially developed country.
World output falls and current account imbalances shrink as capital flows are reduced.
These patterns are in line with the observed macroeconomic developments following the
financial crisis that started in the US in 2007. Output may expand in the less financially
developed country. This is interesting, because the expansion of the Chinese economy
in particular following the crisis has generally been attributed to the country’s fiscal
expansion. Our model suggests that financial integration dampens the interest rate effects
and amplifies the output effects in the country where the crisis originates. In addition,
the responses of interest rates and aggregate output with respect to the financial crisis
are qualitatively similar under the two alternative settings.
6 Conclusion
Although limited commitment and incomplete markets in our model economy capture
different aspects of financial market imperfections and distort aggregate investment in
different dimensions, they generate qualitatively identical distortions of interest rates and
production efficiency under international financial autarky. Financial integration amelio-
rates these distortions in the less financially developed country. In particular, the steady-
state patterns of international capital flows and the transitional dynamics following a
financial crisis are also qualitatively identical across the two alternative model settings.
Integrating both types of frictions into our model, we have shown that there is a one-to-one
mapping from the severity of limited commitment to the degree of market incomplete-
ness. Thus, the two approaches are observationally equivalent in their macroeconomic
consequences.
23
References
Angeletos, G.-M. (2007): “Uninsured Idiosyncratic Investment Risk and Aggregate Saving,” Review
of Economic Dynamics, 10(1), 1–30.
Angeletos, G.-M., and V. Panousi (2011): “Financial integration, entrepreneurial risk and global
dynamics,” Journal of Economic Theory, 146(3), 863–896.
Antras, P., and R. Caballero (2009): “Trade and Capital Flows: A Financial Frictions Perspective,”
Journal of Political Economy, 117(4), 701–744.
Antras, P., M. Desai, and F. Foley (2009): “Multinational Firms, FDI flows and Imperfect Capital
Markets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3), 1171–1219.
Aoki, K., G. Benigno, and N. Kiyotaki (2009): “Capital Flows and Asset Prices,” in International
Seminar on Macroeconomics 2007, ed. by R. Clarida, and F. Giavazzi. NBER, The University of
Chicago Press.
Bitler, M. P., T. J. Moskowitz, and A. Vissing-Jørgensen (2005): “Testing Agency Theory
with Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth,” Journal of Finance, 60(2), 539–576.
Buera, F. J., and Y. Shin (2010): “Productivity Growth and Capital Flows: The Dynamics of
Reforms,” .
Caballero, R., E. Farhi, and P.-O. Gourinchas (2008): “An Equilibrium Model of ”Global Im-
balances” and Low Interest Rates,” American Economic Review, 98(1), 358–93.
Carroll, C. D., and O. Jeanne (2011): “A Tractable Model of Precautionary Reserves, Net Foreign
Assets, or Sovereign Wealth Funds,” NBER Working Paper No. 15228.
Devereux, M. B., and A. Sutherland (2009): “A Portfolio Model of Capital Flows to Emerging
Markets,” Journal of Development Economics, 89(2), 181–193.
Gourinchas, P.-O., and O. Jeanne (2009): “Capital Flows to Developing Countries: The Allocation
Puzzle,” .
Hausmann, R., and F. Sturzenegger (2007): “The missing dark matter in the wealth of nations
and its implications for global imbalances,” Economic Policy, 22(51), 469 – 518.
Higgins, M., T. Klitgaard, and C. Tille (2007): “Borrowing Without Debt? Understanding the
U.S. International Investment Position,” Business Economics, 42(1), 17.
Ju, J., and S.-J. Wei (2010): “Domestic Institutions and the Bypass Effect of Financial Globalization,”
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, forthcoming.
Kocherlakota, N. (1990): “Disentangling the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion from the Elasticity
of Intertemporal Substitution: An Irrelevance Result,” Journal of Finance, 45(1), 175–90.
24
Lane, P., and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti (2001): “The external wealth of nations: measures of foreign
assets and liabilities for industrial and developing countries,” Journal of International Economics,
55(2), 263–294.
(2007a): “A Global Perspective on External Positions,” in G7 Current Account Imbalances:
Sustainability and Adjustment, ed. by R. Clarida. The University of Chicago Press.
Lane, P. R., and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti (2007b): “The external wealth of nations mark II: Revised
and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970,” Journal of International Economics,
73(2), 223–250.
Matsuyama, K. (2004): “Financial Market Globalization, Symmetry-Breaking, and Endogenous In-
equality of Nations,” Econometrica, 72(3), 853–884.
Mendoza, E. G., and V. Quadrini (2010): “Financial Globalization, Financial Crises and Contagion,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 57(1), 24–39.
Mendoza, E. G., V. Quadrini, and J.-V. Rios-Rull (2009): “Financial Integration, Financial
Deepness, and Global Imbalances,” Journal of Political Economy, 117(3), 371–416.
Moskowitz, T. J., and A. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002): “The Returns to Entrepreneurial Investment:
A Private Equity Premium Puzzle?,” American Economic Review, 92(4), 745–778.
Prasad, E. S., R. Rajan, and A. Subramanian (2006): “Patterns of International Capital Flows and
their Implications for Economic Development,” in Proceedings of the 2006 Jackson Hole Symposium,
pp. 119–158. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
(2007): “Foreign Capital and Economic Growth,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 38(1),
153–230.
Sandri, D. (2010): “Growth and Capital Flows with Risky Entrepreneurship,” .
Selden, L. (1978): “A New Representation of Preferences over ”Certain x Uncertain” Consumption
Pairs: The ”Ordinal Certainty Equivalent” Hypothesis,” Econometrica, 46(5), 1045–1060.
Smith, K. A., and D. Valderrama (2008): “Why Do Emerging Economies Import Direct Investment
and Export Savings? A Story of Financial Underdevelopment,” working paper.
Song, Z., K. Storesletten, and F. Zilibotti (2011): “Growing like China,” American Economic
Review, 101(1), 196–233.
Tille, C., and E. van Wincoop (2008): “International Capital Flows under Dispersed Information:
Theory and Evidence,” NBER Working Paper No. 14390.
(2010): “International Capital Flows,” Journal of International Economics, 80(2), 157–175.
von Hagen, J., and H. Zhang (2011): “International Capital Flows and Aggregate Output,” CEPR
Discussion Papers 8400.
25
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. According to equations (7b), the relative price is rewritten as χit+1 ≡
V i,At+1
V i,Bt+1
=
Ri,ht
V i,Bt+1
.
Combining equations (3), (7a), (7d), and (7e), we get the lending of individual household di,ht =
θi
θi+1
βωit. Combining it with equations (7a) and (7d), we get
χit+1 = θ
i
[
1 +
η
1− η
di,et
di,et
]
=
η + θi
1− η = 1−
θ¯ − θi
1− η (21)
Thus, the relative price is time invariant χit+1 = χ
i
IFA and positively related with θ
i, under
IFA. According to equations (7b), the equity rate of entrepreneurs in sector B is rewritten as
Ri,et = R
i,h
t
1−θi
χit+1−θi
. Combining it with equation (6) and using equation (21) to substitute away
θi with χiIFA, we get the solution to the loan rate as specified in equation (8b). Plugging it back
to equation (6), we get the solution to the equity rate as specified in equation (8f). The price
of intermediate good B is obtained by definition. Given the Cobb-Douglas production function
as specified in equation (2), (ωit+1)
1−α(V i,At+1)
α
2 (V i,Bt+1)
α
2 = 1 and the dynamic equation of wages
is obtained as specified in equation (8e).
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. A second-order Taylor approximation of ln ζit around σ = 0 gives,
ln ζit =
lnEt(ζˆ
i
t+1)
1−γ
1− γ ≈ Et ln ζˆ
i
t+1 +
(1− γ)Vart ln ζˆit+1
2
(22)
≈ φit lnV i,At+1 + (1− φit) lnV i,Bt+1 −
(φit)
2
2
γ[(1− λi)σ]2 (23)
The agent chooses φit to maximize the ex ante risk-adjusted rate of portfolio return, ln ζ
i
t , and
the first order condition gives the optimal portfolio choice,
φit ≈
lnV i,At+1 − lnV i,Bt+1
γ[(1− λi)σ]2 =
lnχit+1
γ[(1− λi)σ]2 ≈
χit+1 − 1
γ[(1− λi)σ]2 . (24)
Let ξit ≡ χ
i
t+1−1
(1−λi)σ denote the Sharpe Ratio. Plugging the solution of φ
i
t into equation (22),
ln ζit ≈ lnV i,Bt+1 +
(ξit)
2
2γ
, ⇒ ζit ≈ V i,Bt+1e
(ξit)
2
2γ ≈ V i,Bt+1 [1 +
(ξit)
2
2γ
]. (25)
Using equations (3), (9d), and (26), we get the relative price as a constant depending on the
degree of market completeness,
χit+1 =
V i,At+1
V i,Bt+1
=
M i,Bt+1
M i,At+1
=
1− φit
φit
⇒ χit+1 = χiIFA ≈
√
1 + γ[(1− λi)σ]2 > 1 (26)
Use (χiIFA)
2− 1 = γ[(1− λi)σ]2 to substitute away γ[(1− λi)σ]2 from equation (26), we get the
portfolio choice φit ≈ χ
i
IFA−1
(χiIFA)
2−1 =
1
χiIFA+1
.
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Plugging the solution to φit and V
i,A
t+1 = χ
i
IFAR
i
t into equation (10), we solve the risk-free
interest rate as specified in equation (11b). Other variables can be solved as in the proof of
Proposition 2.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. First, we prove that equation (15a) is the solution
to the equity rate under full capital mobility. Define ∆χit+1 ≡ χit+1 − χiIFA. If the borrowing
constraint is binding, it holds under IFA and under full capital mobility,
χit+1 =
Ri,ht (1− θi)
Ri,et
+ θi, ⇒ ∆χ
i
t+1
1− θi =
Ri,ht
Ri,et
− R
i,h
IFA
Ri,eIFA
. (27)
According to equation (6), (1 − η)Ri,hIFA + ηRi,eIFA = ΨIFA. Substituting Ri,ht and Ri,hIFA with
Ri,et and R
i,e
IFA using equation (14) and R
i,h
IFA =
1
(1−η)(ΨIFA − ηRi,eIFA), we solve the equity rate
from equation (27). Plug in the solution to the equity rate in equation (14) to solve the loan
rate Ri,ht .
Second, we prove that χit+1 is constant under full capital mobility. Let us assume that χ
i
t+1
is time variant and so is the auxiliary variable Zit+1 defined in equation (15a). According to
equation (15a), the equity rate equalization in country i and N implies that
RS,eIFA −ZSt+1 = RN,eIFA −ZNt+1, (28)
∆χSt+1 =
1− θS
1− θN ∆χ
N
t+1 +
(
1
pNIFA
− 1
pSIFA
)
1− θS
1− η , (29)
∂∆χit+1
∂∆χNt+1
=
1− θi
1− θN > 0. (30)
Using equations (15a), (15e), and (29), we rewrite the condition, ΩSt + Ω
N
t = 0, into
ωSt+1∆χ
S
t+1
pSIFA(1− η)
1− θS + ω
N
t+1∆χ
N
t+1
pNIFA(1− η)
1− θN = 0 (31)
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, ωit+1 = (χ
i
t+1)
ρ
2 (Rit)
−ρ. Combining it with the
loan rate equalization, Ri,ht = R
∗,h
t , we simplify equation (31) as
KSt+1 +KNt+1 = 0, where Kit+1 ≡ (∆χit+1 + χiIFA)
ρ
2 ∆χit+1
piIFA(1− η)
1− θi , (32)
∂Kit+1
∂∆χit+1
= (χit+1)
ρ
2
−1(χit+1 +
ρ
2
∆χit+1)
piIFA(1− η)
1− θi > 0. (33)
Using equations (29) to substitute ∆χit+1 with ∆χ
N
t+1, the left-hand side of equation (32) becomes
a monotonically increasing function of ∆χNt+1,
∂(KSt+1 +KNt+1)
∂∆χNt+1
=
∂KSt+1
∂∆χSt+1
∂∆χSt+1
∂∆χNt+1
+
∂KNt+1
∂∆χNt+1
> 0. (34)
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Suppose that ∆χNt+1 ≥ 0. Equation (29) implies that ∆χit+1 > 0. According to the definition of
Kit+1, ∆χit+1 > 0 implies that Kit+1 > 0. Thus, the left-hand side of equation (32) is larger than
zero, which contradicts equation (32). Thus, there exits a unique solution of ∆χNt+1 smaller than
zero and time-invariant. Using equations (29), we can then solve ∆χSt+1, accordingly.
Finally, we prove the existence of a unique and stable steady state under full capital mobility.
χit+1 is time-invariant and so is Z it+1. Let Ri,hFCM ≡ Ri,hIFA + η1−ηZ iFCM which is same across
countries, Ri,hFCM = R
∗,h
FCM . Thus, the loan rate depends on the dynamics of the world-average
wages, according to equation (15b). So is the wage in country i,
ωit+1 =
(
ωwt+1
ωwt
R∗FCM
)−ρ
(χiFCM )
ρ
2 .
The dynamics of the world-average wages are
ωwt+1 =
ωSt+1 + ω
N
t+1
2
=
(
ωwt+1
ωwt
R∗,hFCM
)−ρ (χSFCM ) ρ2 + (χNFCM ) ρ2
2
,
ωwt+1 =
(
ωwt
R∗,hFCM
)α [
(χSFCM )
ρ
2 + (χNFCM )
ρ
2
2
]1−α
Given α ∈ (0, 1), the phase diagram of the world-average wage is concave. Thus, there exists
a unique and stable steady state. Proportional to the wage, aggregate output in country i is
determined by the world output dynamics.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. The proof consists of three steps.
First, we prove that FDI equalizes the Sharpe ratio across the border. An agent born in
country i can choose between investing its single project domestically or abroad. According to
the solution to the optimal portfolio choices in Angeletos (2007) and Angeletos and Panousi
(2011), three factors determine the agent’s optimal portfolio share of risky investment and the
risk-adjusted rate of portfolio return, i.e., the mean rate of return in the risky sector, lnV i,At+1,
the risk-free interest rate, lnRit, and the risk-sharing factor λ
i. By assumption, agents obtain
risk sharing in the country where they make the risky investment. Given the world risk-free
interest rate R∗t , the portfolio share of risky investment and the risk-adjusted rate of portfolio
return are φi,lt ≈ ζ
i,l
t
γ(1−λl)σ and ξ
i,l
t ≈ R∗t
[
1 +
(ζi,lt )
2
2γ
]
, if the agent born in country i makes the
risky investment abroad in country l 6= i, where the Sharpe ratio is ζi,lt ≡
lnV l,At+1−lnR∗t
(1−λl)σ . In
equilibrium, an agent is indifferent between investing the risky project domestically or abroad.
Given Rit = R
l
t = R
∗
t , the no-arbitrage condition ξ
i,l
t = ξ
i
t is simplified as the equalization of the
Sharpe ratio, ζ lt = ζ
i
t , and the portfolio share is simplified as φ
i,l
t = φ
l
t.
Suppose that FDI flows are from country N to country S, i.e., ΩNt > 0 > Ω
S
t and Ω
N
t +Ω
S
t = 0.
The total savings of agents born in country N but making the risky investment abroad is
ΩNt
φSt
,
while the total savings of agents born in country N and making the risky investment domestically
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is
MN,At+1
φNt
. Thus, the aggregate savings of agents born in country N and in country S are specified
as in equations (17b) and (17b), respectively.
Second, we prove by contradiction that χit+1 is time-invariant under full capital mobility.
Assume that χit+1 is time-variant. The equalization of the Sharpe Ratio ζ
S
t+1 = ζ
N
t+1 = ζ
∗
t+1
implies that χSt+1 is linear and increasing in χ
N
t+1,
χSt+1 − 1
1− λS =
χNt+1 − 1
1− λN . (35)
Net capital flows sum up to zero at the world level,
β(ωSt + ω
N
t ) =
ρ
2R∗t
[
ωSt+1
(1 + χSt+1)
χSt+1
+ ωNt+1
(1 + χNt+1)
χNt+1
]
, (36)
2(ωSt+1 + ω
N
t+1) = [1 +
(ξSt+1)
2
γ
]ωSt+1
(1 + χSt+1)
χSt+1
+ [1 +
(ξNt+1)
2
γ
]ωNt+1
(1 + χNt+1)
χNt+1
. (37)
Since ωit+1 = (χ
i
t+1)
− ρ
2 (Rit)
−ρ and RSt = RNt = R∗t , equation (37) can be rewritten as
2[(χSt+1)
− ρ
2 + (χNt+1)
− ρ
2 ] =[1 +
(ξSt+1)
2
γ
][(χSt+1)
− ρ
2 + (χSt+1)
− ρ
2
−1]+ (38)
[1 +
(ξNt+1)
2
γ
][(χNt+1)
− ρ
2 + (χNt+1)
− ρ
2
−1]. (39)
Since
(ξit+1)
2
γ =
(χit+1−1)2
(χiIFA)
2−1 is a function of χ
i
t+1, given χ
i
IFA as a constant. Thus, according to
equation (39), χSt+1 is an implicit function of χ
N
t+1 and it can be proved that
∂χSt+1
∂χNt+1
< 0. Thus,
according to equations (35) and (39), there exists a unique and time-invariant solution to χNt+1
and χSt+1.
Finally, we prove the existence of a unique and stable steady state under full capital mobility.
The relative price and the Sharpe ratio are time invariant which are denoted by χiFCM and ξ
i
FCM ,
respectively. Define RiFCM ≡ ρβ 1
1+
(ξ∗
FCM
)2
γ
, which is same across countries, RiFCM = R
∗
FCM .
Thus, the loan rate depends on the dynamics of the world-average wages, Rit+1 =
ωwt+1
ωwt
R∗FCM
and so does the wage in country i,
ωit+1 =
(
ωwt+1
ωwt
R∗FCM
)−ρ
(χiFCM )
− ρ
2 .
The dynamics of the world-average wages are
ωwt+1 =
ωSt+1 + ω
N
t+1
2
=
(
ωwt+1
ωwt
R∗FCM
)−ρ (χSFCM )− ρ2 + (χNFCM )− ρ2
2
,
ωwt+1 =
(
ωwt
R∗FCM
)α [(χSFCM )− ρ2 + (χNFCM )− ρ2
2
]1−α
Given α ∈ (0, 1), the phase diagram of the world-average wage is concave. Thus, there exists
a unique and stable steady state. Proportional to the wage, aggregate output in country i is
determined by the world output dynamics.
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Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. The relative intermediate goods price χiIFA reflects the distortion of two financial frictions
on aggregate allocation under IFA. Let χiIFA,LC and χ
i
IFA,IM denote the respective relative
intermediate goods price under the model setting of limited commitment and that of incomplete
markets. According to equations (8e) and (11e), the wage rate has the same functional form
with respect to χiIFA and so does aggregate output. Obviously, the steady-state aggregate
output is same across the two model settings and so are the loan rate in the setting of limited
commitment and the risk-free interest rate in the setting of incomplete markets, as long as
χiIFA,LC =
1
χiIFA,IM
. That is, 1 − θ¯−θi1−η = 1√1+γ[(1−λi)σ]2 and the solution to θ
i is a function of
λi in the form, θi = θ¯ − (1 − η)
{
1− 1√
1+γ[(1−λi)σ]2
}
. A necessary condition for θi ∈ [0, θ¯) is
1 +
√
1 + γ[(1− λi)σ]2 ≤ 1η .
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